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THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
DISCRETION: A STUDY OF A
REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Michael C. Harper*

W

riting for a recent symposium on empirical research in administrative law, Professor Paul Verkuil noted that such research
"casts light on one of the dark corners of the law. The vast majority of
administrative decisions are of the informal variety, meaning they take
place outside the reach of generic administrative procedure acts and
frequently outside the courts themselves."' We are only beginning to
appreciate how vast is this dark corner and how varied the possible
modes of illumination.
This essay casts some additional light into the corner by reporting on
a study of the exercise of executive discretion by a regional office of the
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) within the Department of Labor. The essay was commissioned by ETA officials in the
Department's national office who wished to determine whether subordinate ETA regional offices might affect the implementation of the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)2 by exercising
discretion independent of their superiors in the national office.' At
least as an initial matter, and perhaps to conserve resources, the Department requested only a study of regional office decisionmaking
rather than a study of the reaction of state and local government
recipients of CETA funds to this decisionmaking. 4 The national
*Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. Harvard University, A.B., 1970; J.D.,
1973.
'Verkuil, On Empirical Research, 32 AD. L. REV. 69, 70 (1980).
229 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (Supp. IV 1980).
3The study was conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Employment Policy
at Boston University by myself with the industrious and insightful assistance of Mr.
Richard R. Wasserman and Ms. Michele E. Neidick, former Boston University law
students.
4
The study was intended to be preliminary in another sense. The Department did not
suggest some theory for procedural or substantive reform in the CETA system for which
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officers thought that understanding better the extent to which and the
manner by which regional officers might potentially influence CETA
programs would enable the Department to achieve more efficiently the
employment training goals of CETA.
Budgetary cuts and shifting political winds have jeopardized the
future of CETA, but the study nonetheless provides another comparative perspective for the growing number of students of informal administrative processes which are structured neither by legislative nor
byjudicial decisions. The study suggests a typology of executive discretion which distinguishes between executive authority to interpret a
statutory scheme and authority to determine how administrative resources will be used to implement a statutory scheme without any
further interpretation of the commands and goals of the scheme. In
addition to enabling the study to present a coherent picture of the
discretionary behavior which was studied, this typology helps illustrate
how some administrative behavior which is rational for administrative
officials may also be functional for the officials' bureaucracy and the
mission with which the bureaucracy is charged.
The study drew three principal conclusions concerning the specific
executive behavior studied. First, most of the regional office's exercise
of discretionary authority was in response to specific factual problems,
controversies, and questions. The office as a rule did not attempt to
anticipate and resolve general issues before they became manifest in a
particular factual context.
Second, notwithstanding this reactive rather than anticipatory mode
of operation, the regional office was able to avoid committing ETA to
any challengeable new interpretations or formulations of CETA law
suggested by parties outside ETA. In most cases the regional office was
able to resolve the legal issues presented to it by a straightforward
application of the law embodied in ETA regulations. And in those
cases in which the regional office was forced to choose between two
reasonable interpretations of CETA law, the office tended to reject any
it wished to obtain support. In this sense, the study seems to have differed from most
other empirical studies of informal administrative processes. Professor Davis, for instance, studied Chicago police officer behavior in order to highlight what he views as the
inconsistency and official hypocrisy of much administrative action and in order to stress a
consequent need to "confine, structure and check" executive discretion. See K. DAVIS,
POLICE DISCRETION (1975). See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA

(1976); K.

DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

(1969).

Other legal scholars have examined the exercise of discretion by subordinate administrators in order to influence efforts to reform a particular administrative system. E.g.,
Handler & Hollingsworth, Reforming Welfare: The Constraints of the Bureaucracy and the
Clients, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1167 (1970); Mashaw, Welfare Reform andLocalAdministrationof
Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971).
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new interpretation suggested by the party outside CETA which presented the problem.
Third, the regional office independently attempted to affect CETA
programs delivered by prime sponsors much more through decisions
to emphasize certain goals or requirements of CETA-and what the
office viewed as the best or preferred means to achieve these goalsthan it did through interpretations or further refinements of the actual
requirements or proscriptions of CETA. The regional office frequently communicated to prime sponsors that they should concentrate
on the achievement of particular CETA goals or requirements, without
in any way refining the meaning of these goals or requirements. Furthermore, the office often suggested that a prime sponsor modify its
programs in order to escape the office's special scrutiny, without stating that the modification was actually required by the Act.
In my judgment, the behavior of executive officers observed by the
study is both understandable and functional for the officers' bureaucracy. The study's conclusions suggest a preference for incremental rather than comprehensive decisionmaking which protects the
officers from potentially embarrassing controversy. More important,
the conclusions suggest that the officers desire to husband discretion in
order to enable them to respond with greater flexibility and leverage to
future challenges to their bureaucracy's authority.'
I. A SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND ITS FINDINGS
A. Background
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 substantially decentralized the operation of federally funded employment
training programs.' CETA authorized block grants to state and local
governments designated as eligible "prime sponsors." 7 CETA directed
the local governments to follow certain procedures and to observe
certain substantive standards, but it gave the governments wide discretion to design employment training programs and to allocate federal
moneys among their various programs. Congress intended that CETA
would insure greater local government responsibility for employment
5
We filed three reports of the findings of this study, one report for each half of the
1979 fiscal year and one report encompassing the entire study. Copies of these unpublished reports are available at the Institute for Employment Policy at Boston University.

6

See

TRANSITION TO DECENTRALIZED MANPOWER PROGRAMS (W.

Mirengoff ed. 1976).

The CETA system replaced the categorical grants of the earlier Manpower Development
and Training Act of 1962 and Title I of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
7
See 29 U.S.C. § 811 (Supp. IV 1980).
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training programs and would reap the consequent benefits of better
federal and state cooperation." In accord with this intent, the Secretary
of Labor placed primary responsibility for the oversight of state and
local government CETA programs in regional ETA offices.
Officials in the ETA national office recognized that the delegation of
oversight responsibility to regional offices might encourage significant
variations in CETA programs among the various ETA regions.9 Many
of the goals, requirements and proscriptions of CETA, like those of
most statutes, were broadly and sometimes vaguely stated. Even some
of CETA's more specific and clear provisions presented ambiguities
which afforded ETA officials important discretion to develop CETA
law. In addition, the goals and commands of CETA were sufficiently
numerous and difficult to achieve so as to present significant decisions
to ETA concerning priorities and strategies for enforcement and implementation.
ETA's national office developed and promulgated final resolutions"
which in many cases made more specific CETA's requirements and
proscriptions, and in other cases, indicated how ETA intended that the
goals of the Act should be achieved. The national office also issued
guidelines and "field memoranda" which gave further indication of the
Secretary's interpretation of CETA and his strategies for its effective
implementation. But the national office appreciated that broad discretionary authority remained for regional officers and that much of the
exercise of this authority was not, and probably could not be, reviewed
effectively. The national office commissioned the study to help determine how important the exercise of regional office discretion might be
to the ultimate goal of CETA-the delivery of effective employment
training programs by the state and local government prime sponsor
recipients of CETA funds.
B. Methodology
We were asked to examine the exercise of discretionary authority by
the Boston Region One ETA office during the 1979 fiscal year, from
October 1, 1978 through September 30, 1979. We were not asked to
make comparisons among regions. Resource limitations prevented us
from tracing through the actual effects of regional office decisionmaking on state and local government prime sponsor programs. In accord
with the Department's intended use of the study, we concentrated our
research on documents at the regional office which might evidence
'See 29 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 1980).
utilized ten such regions and ten regional offices to coordinate them.
" See 20 C.F.R. §§ 675-689 (1980).

9
ETA
0
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some attempt to influence CETA program delivery, regardless of
whether the attempt was in fact successful.
We scanned these documents for regional office decisions which
were both programmatic and independent. Given ETA's ultimate concern with how a regional office exercise of discretion might affect
CETA program delivery, we looked for decisions which might have
influenced prime sponsors in one of three ways. First, regional office
decisions might have directly influenced the type and nature of employment and training services delivered by prime sponsors. Second,
the regional office could have had a significant impact by influencing
prime sponsor choice of the individuals who participated in CETA
programs. Finally, a regional office decision might have affected programs by influencing the type of delivery agents of CETA services.
In addition to considering whether individual regional office decisions might have a potential direct impact on CETA programs, we also
had to determine whether those decisions had been made independent
of national office directives. Communications by the Boston office to
prime sponsors could announce important CETA policy formulated
by national, rather than regional, office personnel. In order to reach
anyjudgments on the regional office's exercise of discretionary authority under CETA, we had to analyze the degree to which the regional
office communications reviewed were simply repetitions of national
office communications or restatements of CETA statutory or regulatory provisions. "
After discussions with regional office personnel, we decided to review six sources of written communications and documents. First, we
reviewed each of the more than 330 Region One Letter Series (RILS)
formal letters transmitted by the regional office to all Region One
prime sponsors during the 1979 fiscal year. 2 Second, we reviewed
available files of what regional officers termed a "vast majority, if not
all" other less formal telegrams and information bulletins sent to all
'Our purpose was not to evaluate the regional office's influence on national policy. We
were advised by regional officers that their suggestions to the national office often came
back to them in the form of some national office communication. Because this assertion
was not relevant to the issue of the regional office's independent exercise of discretionary
authority, we did not attempt to check its accuracy by comparing letters sent back and
forth from the national office. Although the regional office influence on national office
decisionmaking may have been more important than independent regional office decisionmaking, the study's purpose was to analyze only the latter. Our focus, therefore,
was on regional office communications to the prime sponsors, rather than to the national
office.
"However, 130 of these letters were copies of letters to State Employment Security
Agency Administrators sent to prime sponsors "for information only" and therefore did
not require close analysis.
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prime sponsors during the 1979 fiscal year. Our third source of documents was the "reading files" of three selected prime sponsors. With
the exception of certain special communications which we reviewed
elsewhere, these files contained all the written communications to and
from the regional office pertaining to these particular prime sponsors.' 3 The fourth set of documents reviewed was the sixty-eight 1979
fiscal year "findings and determinations" of the regional office on
formal complaints filed against prime sponsors under the CETA
regulations. 4 Fifth, we reviewed the four final determinations on audit
reports issued by the Boston regional office during the 1979 fiscal
year. 5 And sixth, we reviewed the written opinions of the Department
of Labor regional solicitor submitted to the ETA regional administrator during 1979.16
"3Reading files were maintained by regional officers during 1979 on each of the
twenty-six Region One prime sponsors, but the volume of letters in these files and the
limitations on our time precluded us from reviewing each file.
Each of the prime sponsors was under the authority of one of the regional office's two
grant officers. Subordinate to each grant officer were field representatives, each assigned
to oversee the operation of one prime sponsor's programs. Field representatives monitored prime sponsors' performance, provided technical assistance and guidance, assured
statutory and regulatory compliance, and performed a wide range of tasks as working
liaisons between the regional office and local program officials. Typically, regional office
communications to individual prime sponsors were written by the respective prime
sponsor's field representative for signature by a grant officer. The field representative
was thus actively involved in the creation and management of his or her particular prime
sponsor reading file.
Of the three prime sponsors which we selected to review, two, Balance of State
Massachusetts and Balance of State Maine, were under the authority of one grant officer;
the third, Balance of State Rhode Island, was under the charge of the other. The three
prime sponsors chosen for our review were also the responsibility of several different
field representatives during the twelve-month period studied. However, we were not
able to note variances in the exercise of discretionary authority which reflected differing
personalities or administrative styles. See note 65 infra.
' 4CETA regulations covering complaint procedures were amended during the 1979
fiscal year. Those procedures in effect before April 1, 1979, can be found at 42 Fed. Reg.
55772-55774 (1977). Procedures in effect for the remainder of the fiscal year are set
forth at 20 C.F.R. § 676.81-93 (1980).
'5 CETA empowered the Secretary of Labor to audit periodically prime sponsor
operations "to ensure compliance with the provisions of [the Act] and regulations... and
to ensure conduct of programs in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives
of [the Act] ..
" 29 U.S.C. § 816(j) (Supp. IV 1980).
"All the other documents which we reviewed were transmitted by the ETA regional
office to prime sponsors; these documents were transmitted to the ETA by Department
of Labor personnel not under the authority of the regional administrator of ETA. Our
decision, nonetheless, to review these documents was based on two considerations. First,
in order to understand better the process of regional office decisionmaking, we wished to
examine the extent to which the regional office's exercise of discretion was influenced by
the interpretations of CETA law given the office by the regional solicitor. Second, we
thought the regional solicitor's opinions might include a large number of interpretations
of CETA law which could have influenced directly the CETA programs delivered in New
England if adopted by the regional office and communicated to prime sponsors.
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C. A Typology of Executive Discretion
My preliminary overview of the above sets of documents indicated
that it would be important for the study to distinguish two types of
discretionary authority exercised by the Boston ETA regional office
(and exercised by most executive offices): first, authority to interpret
or refine the commands and goals of a statutory scheme; and second,
authority to determine how the executive will attempt to achieve
observance of the commands and fulfillment of the goals of a statute
without further refining those commands and goals.
The first type of executive discretionary authority, the authority to
interpret or refine the meaning of the commands and goals of a
statutory scheme, has been more often the subject of legal analysis. No
matter how detailed, statutory provisions can usually be further refined. Often they must be refined before they can be applied meaningfully to specific factual patterns.'7 The responsibility for much of the
refinement of a statute inevitably falls upon the executive office which
is charged with its implementations. Sometimes this responsibility is
limited to the interpretation of legislative intent. Legislative bodies
often intend that statutory provisions are to have one and only one
particular meaning. An executive office's refinement of such provisions is no more than an initial interpretation of a direct legislative
command.'"
However, executive authority to refine or formulate rights and
obligations under a statute is often not so limited. Several possible
meanings of a provision are sometimes consistent with legislative intent, and it is then within the executive's authority to decide which
meaning best advances the goals and is most consistent with the general
structure of the statute.'9 Moreover, sometimes a statute directs or
permits a responsible executive office to establish legal rights and
obligations which will best achieve the goals of the statute." In such
'"In my opinion, regulations, revenue rulings and court opinions interpreting the
Internal Revenue Code provide some of the most compelling examples of this proposition.
'"Although courts frequently declare that they will give some degree of deference to a
responsible executive office's interpretation of legislative intent, see, e.g., Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,450 (1978); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965),
the divining of such intent is the job of courts; and in fact, judges do not hesitate to
substitute theirjudgment on legislative intent for that of the executive. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,566 n.20 (1979); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
9
See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,569 n. 13 (1980) (indicating
that the Federal Reserve Board could have given either of two mutually contradictory
interpretations
to the Truth in Lending Act consistently with congressional intent).
2
°See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) (upholding as consistent with
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cases, a legislative body intends that the executive office do more than
simply interpret the meaning of the statute; the executive must itself
2
formulate law and policy under the authority of the statute. '
Whether interpreting a statute for which it has responsibility or
formulating new legal rights or obligations under the authority of a
statute, the executive office sometimes proceeds by general pronouncement of a new legal rule and it sometimes proceeds by developing the law through application to a new specific factual pattern. When
the ETA promulgated CETA regulations or explained the regulations
in a field memorandum, it took the former course. When it applied the
law to resolve a specific factual controversy raised by a prime sponsor
or a grievant against a prime sponsor, it took the latter course.
Regardless of the manner of its exercise, the above-described power,
which I designate "interpretive or lawmaking discretion," is entirely
distinct from a second type of discretion which I find illuminating to
designate as "emphatic." Emphatic discretion is the authority to allocate or to threaten to allocate limited administrative resources in order
to achieve observance of a statutory scheme's commands and fulfillment of the scheme's goals without any interpretation of the meaning
of the commands or goals. Executive officers can affect the implementation of a statute without in any way interpreting the statute's legal
commands because insuring the observance of any legal command
generally requires the expenditure of administrative resources, and
like any institution, an executive office invariably confronts important
limitations on its resources. Therefore, an executive office exercises
important discretion to determine how a statutory scheme's commands
and goals are to be met by deciding how much of its limited resources
should be expended on the enforcement or implementation of each of
the various commands or goals.2 CETA indeed provides a good examthe purposes and structure of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) the
Secretary of Labor's establishment of an employee right under OSHA to refuse to
perform
dangerous work).
2
See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-267 (1975). The legislature
thereby effectively delegates lawmaking discretionary authority to an executive office
having (1) some special expertise, (2) a policy-making bureaucracy, and (3) some degree
of insulation from the political winds which buffet Congress. Since this executive authority does not rest on judging legislative intent, thejudiciary's review of the exercise of the
authority
should be and is limited. Id.
22
Arguably some executive decisions to deemphasize the enforcement of certain legal
commands do not depend upon any limitations on administrative resources, but rather
derive directly from an executive perception that the public does not want the commands
vigorously enforced. SeeJ. Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 7 (1968). Generally, however, executive decisions not to do everything possible to implement particular
statutory commands are generated by some resource limitation.
As other commentators have noted, the discretion to allocate resources among commands becomes more significant as the commands for which the officials are responsible
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pie of a statutory scheme whose commands and goals were far too
numerous, and too aspirational," for ETA officials to address in some
ideal exhaustive manner.
Perhaps the most obvious examples of executive decisions which
affect the implementation of a statute by allocating limited administrative resources without interpreting a legal command are certain instances of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute for violations of particular commands clearly
emphasize or deemphasize those commands and thereby affect the
implementation of the statute. 4 Yet those decisions can be made and
often are made without any refinement of the meaning of the commands.
Decisions whether to prosecute, however, are simply illustrative.
Whenever an executive office allocates certain of its resources to one
area within its responsibilities rather than another, it may be affecting
the implementation of a statute without interpreting the meaning of
that statute.15 Indeed an executive office may influence the implementation of a statute simply by stressing certain statutory goals or
commands to parties or entities affected by the statute. For instance,
when ETA told prime sponsors that their programs were most deficient for falling short of a particular statutory goal, it was exercising
its discretion to decide which CETA requirements were to be stressed,
not what CETA requires.
An executive office, moreover, can utilize this second form of discretion to suggest courses of action for parties or entities affected by the
become more numerous. E.g.,J. M.

PROTAS, PEOPLE-PROCESSING

8, 93-96 (1979) (study

of various types of "street-level" social welfare workers); Diver, A Theory of Regulatory
Enforcement,
28 PUB. POL. 257, 283 (1980) (using OSHA inspectors as an example).
2
'The aspirational form of many of the CETA commands, i.e., their injunction of
prime sponsors to do as much as possible to meet various goals, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 816(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980), also afforded ETA officials great discretion to allocate
implementation resources between commands and goals. Since prime sponsors generally could have been doing more toward each aspiration, ETA could choose to emphasize
any
aspiration for any prime sponsor.
24
1Decisions of police patrolmen whether to enforce a statute can be viewed as an
example of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Whether or not they are, these
decisions clearly affect the implementation of the criminal codes and generally are not
dependent upon any refinement of the meaning of the codes. See K. DAvis, POLICE
DISCRETION (1975).
25
A1 of the other administrative activities which Professor Davis has noted are generally not reviewed by courts, but which nonetheless must inevitably involve some exercise
of executive discretion-"initiating, investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling,
contracting, dealing, advising, threatening, publicizing, concealing, planning, recommending, supervising"-also generally involve the allocation of resources to effect the
implementation of a statute. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 22 (1969). Often these activities do not require any refinement of the meaning
of the statute.
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statute, without specifying that these courses of action are required by
the law. The office's discretion to determine how the statute should be
enforced, including the discretion to determine when to prosecute,
gives the office leverage to induce parties to act in ways which will
ensure that the statute will not be applied against them. ETA, for
example, could suggest to a prime sponsor that it should undertake
certain programs which, while not required by the Act, might be
necessary in its case to prove that it was meeting some vague aspirational statutory goal such as providing employment or training "opportunities at levels of skill . . . commensurate with . . . potential
26
capabilities."
We found that distinguishing this second type of executive discretion, whether expressed in the allocation of administrative resources or
in the suggestion or threat of a reallocation, was critical to an understanding of regional office behavior.
D. Findings and Conclusions
As stated above, the study drew three principal conclusions.
First, most of the regional office's exercise of discretionary authority
under CETA was in response to concrete and specific factual problems,
controversies, and questions. Most regional office communications to
prime sponsors of CETA policy or of interpretations of CETA law
either were tied to factual situations or replicated statements of national office policy or the national office's interpretations of CETA law.
It is especially clear that the regional office rarely independently pronounced general refinements of the requirements or goals of CETA
unless forced to do so in order to resolve particular prime sponsor
problems.
If the regional office on its own initiative regularly had formulated
refinements of CETA law for all its prime sponsors, such general
refinements probably would have been communicated in the formal
Region One Letter Series (RILS). However, of the more than 200
229 U.S.C. § 816(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1980). Keith Hawkins, in an unpublished paper on
pollution regulation in Britain, describes a good example of how officials can use their
discretion to allocate enforcement resources to encourage certain activities which the
officials cannot or at least will not assert are necessarily required by the law:
[P]ollution control officers possess, as yet, no legal powers to compel the bunding of oil
tanks. Instead they request that bunding be carried out. This request is, rather, a threat
masquerading as advice since it is so presented as to constitute a warning that if there is
an escape of oil in the future from an unbunded tank, grounds for prosecution are
created, and prosecution is what the discharger should expect.
Hawkins, The Use of Discretion by Regulatory Officials; A Case Study on Environmental
Pollution in the United Kingdom (1980) (unpublished paper on file in my office).
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RILS letters concerning CETA which we reviewed, no more than
twenty-four reflect any independent regional office attempt to influence prime sponsor programs. And of these twenty-four, nineteen
simply stress the relative importance of certain CETA goals or requirements, while only five letters express any refinement of CETA law
beyond that previously pronounced by the national office. 7 Furthermore, at least four of these five letters, although addressed to all prime
sponsors, were written in part in response to questions presented by
particular prime sponsors."

2"We catalogued the regional letters of the RILS for the 1979 fiscal year as follows:
Non-CETA, to Prime Sponsors
for Inform ation O nly ..................................................
(see note 12 supra)
CETA, Non-Program m atic ................................................
(Announcements of training sessions; instructions
on completion of forms; communications of other
non-programmatic information)
CETA Programmatic Repetitions of
National Office Communications ....................................
Regional Office Exercise of
Em phatic D iscretion ................................................
Regional Office Exercise of
Interpretive D iscretion ..............................................

130
135

44
19
5

68
333
25
No significant surprising reformulation of the law was presented in the only formal
regional letter which expresses some refinement in CETA law and which also may have
been written without the provocation of any prime sponsor questions. This letter addresses the role of the National Alliance of Business in the Private Sector Initiative
Program authorized by Title VII of CETA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 981-985 (Supp. IV 1980).
Section 703(b)(6) of this Title provided that "no activity will be funded which does not
have the approval of both the prime sponsor and the private industry council [PIC]."
Section 704(d) of the Title also provided that "the Secretary shall not, by regulation or
otherwise, require that any prime sponsor, in establishing such [private industry] council
give a presumptive role to any particular organization." Nevertheless, the CETA regulations stated that "[i]n prime sponsorjurisdictions in which a National Alliance of Business
(NAB) metro organization exists, it should be given considerationin the establishment of
the PIC." 20 C.F.R. § 679. 3-2(a)(4) (1980) (emphasis added). Thus, the Act and the
regulations presented prime sponsors with the problem of how to give the NAB "consideration" without giving it a "presumptive role" in the establishment of the PIC.
The letter contributes to the resolution of this problem by attempting to refine the
required role of the NAB. The letter explains that the NAB should "assist [prime
sponsors] in mobilizing local business community support and involvement in Title VII."
In all cases where the NAB organization exists, it should assist the prime sponsor in
starting the PIC, but, consistent with Section 704(d) of the Act, it need not actually be
made part of the PIC. Clearly this type of interpretation of CETA's requirements could
affect the delivery of CETA programs. It is the type of independent exercise of interpretive discretionary authority, applicable to all prime sponsors and not in response to a
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The files containing regional telegrams and information bulletins
were even more bereft of evidence of regional office efforts to affect all
Region One CETA programs. These files contain only two examples of
independent regional office emphasis of particular CETA goals and no
examples of regional office general refinements in CETA law.
Findings and determinations of the Equal Employment and Compliance unit on complaints against prime sponsors, the audit determinations completed by the regional office, and the opinions of the
regional solicitor submitted to the regional administrator all reflect
some independent regional office exercise of ETA discretionary authority under CETA. However, all of these determinations and opinions were generated by and were to be applied to some particular
factual problem presented by some prime sponsor or complainant
against a prime sponsor or subgrantee.
Finally, regional office analysis of specific program-related problems
provoked almost all of the significant independent directives transmitted to the three individual prime sponsors whose written communications were comprehensively reviewed. From 190 letters to these prime
sponsors, we found no more than three which express a regional office
emphasis of the general importance of a CETA requirement or goal
which does not relate that requirement or goal to a specific problem of
the prime sponsor addressed. And although we found many letters
which express the regional office's opinion on the application and
meaning of CETA law, all of these letters respond to prime sponsor or
third party questions concerning the applications of CETA law to a
concrete problem or issue.
Second, the study concluded that the regional office was able to
avoid and did avoid committing ETA to any reasonably challengeable
new interpretation or formulation of CETA law suggested by parties
outside ETA. As suggested above, the regional office was often impelled, either by prime sponsor questions or by third party complaints,
particular prime sponsor's problems, which we anticipated being reflected in the regional letters.
In two of the four other required letters which might express some independent
regional office refinement of CETA law, the regional office answered over 150 questions
concerning the 1978 amendments to CETA and other CETA-related topics. Some of the
answers express refinements of the CETA obligations of prime sponsors. However, we
were advised by regional office personnel that many, if not most, of the interpretations of
CETA law in the answers were provided in some form by the national office. Furthermore, the interpretations expressed in these question-and-answer letters were expressly
"tentative" pending ETA's promulgation of new formal regulations under the 1978
CETA amendments. The choice of certain questions might be viewed as a significant
exercise of the regional office's emphatic discretion, but we were also advised that most of
the questions were raised by prime sponsors in letters or training sessions.
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to apply CETA law to individual prime sponsor problems. These
applications did require some exercise of ETA's interpretive or lawmaking discretion; any application of law to a specific set of facts
requires some interpretation or refinement of law, however straightforward and inevitable. However, in most cases the regional office was
able to address adequately the individual problems with direct applications of the law which did not require the rejection of any tenable
alternative interpretation. These straightforward regional office exercises of interpretive discretion did not commit the ETA to the acceptance of any interpretation of CETA law which might be reasonably
challenged by another interpretation.
For example, we determined that forty-eight letters in the three
prime sponsor reading files demonstrated a regional office application
of CETA law to a particular program-related problem. Yet in only
seven cases could we formulate an interpretation of CETA law which
would have supported a letter which reached a contrary conclusion
without violating the clear spirit, if not the letter, of prior regulations
or other directives from the national office.
Two illustrations from the forty-one other cases of the regional
office's nontrivial, but nonetheless straightforward applications of
CETA law are illuminating. Both cases required the regional office to
apply a CETA regulation, but neither case required the office to reject
a reasonable alternative interpretation. In one letter the regional office
applied a CETA regulation which directed prime sponsor personnel to
avoid the "appearance of conflict of interest in awarding financial
assistance";2 9 the office concluded that it would be impossible for the
prime sponsor's contracting officer to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest as long as he also was chairman of the board of an
agency receiving funds from a prime sponsor. In another letter the
regional office interpreted the eligibility criteria for participation in a
Youth Community Conservation Improvement Project (YCCIP)3
stated that a youth eligible for YCCIP must be
The regulations
"unemployed"; 3 the regional office concluded that a youth's unemployment cannot have been created by the youth's resignation from
unsubsidized employment in order to take a CETA position.
Similarly, we counted thirty-four findings and determinations by the
Equal Employment and Compliance (EEC) unit on complaints against
prime sponsors which required the regional office to accept or reject
2920 C.F.R. § 676.62(b) (1980).
'"See 29 U.S.C. §§ 899-906 (Supp. IV 1980).
1120 C.F.R. § 675.5-9(a)(2) (1980).
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the grievant's application of CETA law to his or her case 2 However, it
would have been reasonable and arguably consistent with the letter and
spirit of the law in only five of these cases for the regional office both to
have rejected the grievant's interpretation and instead to have accepted the grievant's interpretation. In the other twenty-nine cases the
only reasonable resolution was the one chosen by the regional office. 3
Nevertheless, the regional office sometimes was forced to choose
between two reasonable interpretations or refinements of CETA law. I
have already noted that both the reading files which we examined and
the EEC findings present several examples of such cases, and we
discovered a few more examples among the regional letters and the
regional solicitor opinions. In these cases we perceived a clear regional
office tendency to reject the new application or interpretation of CETA
law suggested by the party outside ETA which presented the problem
to the regional office.
Thus, the EEC findings and determinations indicate that when a
third party grievant, such as a disappointed CETA participant or
subcontractor, attempted to move the regional office to rule that some
prime sponsor action was required to be prohibited by the Act or
regulations, the regional office was more likely to interpret the ambiguous provision contrary to the grievant and thereby refuse to apply the
law against the prime sponsor. As noted above, we determined that five
formal allegations resolved by the regional office's EEC unit in the
1979 fiscal year forced the office to consider an outside party's interpretation of CETA law which was neither clearly inconsistent with the
"The EEC unit issued findings and determinations on a total of sixty-eight cases
during the 1979 fiscal year. However, the office was able to resolve one-half of these cases
without accepting or rejecting the grievant's interpretation of CETA law. In most of
these cases the regional office decided that there was not sufficient evidence to support
the factual allegations of the complaint. Some of these cases may have involved an
application of a rule of evidence, but none required the regional office to apply any
substantive CETA law.
3
A finding and determination letter issued early in 1979 provides an example of an
EEC decision which required the acceptance of the complainant's application of CETA
regulations to her case, but which did not require the EEC to reject any reasonable
alternative interpretation of CETA law. The complainant had been terminated from her
public-service-employment CETA position after only six weeks of work. The finding and
determination letter states that the "evidence clearly shows... [that] the complainant was
not given written reasons for [the adverse actioi. taken]. There is also some evidence that
the complainant was not advised of the terms and conditions of employment before entry
on duty ... " (emphasis in original). These actions, the decision concludes, violated section
98.25(a) and section 98.24(c) of the CETA pre-1978 amendment regulations. Section
98.26(a) clearly provided that a participant must receive written notice setting forth the
grounds for an adverse action, 42 Fed. Reg. 55769-70 (1977); section 98.24(c) explicitly
provided that a participant "must be advised prior to entering upon employment.., of
his rights and benefits in connection with his employment," 42 Fed. Reg. 55769 (1977).
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letter or spirit of the CETA regulations nor clearly compelled by the
regulations. 3 4 In each of these five cases, the EEC finding and determination rejected the outside party's position. We found no instances
in which the EEC unit committed ETA to applying CETA law against a
prime sponsor in any manner which might be questioned seriously by
the prime sponsor-no instances, in other words, in which the regional
office used a third party complaint as an occasion to formulate a prime
sponsor legal duty which was not clearly mandated by the regulations. 5
A discussion of one of the five cases is illustrative. In this case the
ETA considered three delivery agents' challenges to a prime sponsor's
denial of their applications for contracts in the sponsor's 1979 fiscal
year CETA delivery system. The three outside agencies previously had
contracted with the sponsor and had received the sponsor's highest
program evaluations. Their grievance argued, inter alia, that the prime
sponsor had failed to give "due consideration" to the continued funding of programs of demonstrated effectiveness, as required by applicable CETA law?6 The regional office approved the prime sponsor's
finding that, after the sponsor decided not to subcontract its delivery of
services, it had no duty to give any special consideration to the continued funding of past effective subcontractors.
This decision was not inevitable. Although "due consideration" had
not been defined in the Act or the regulations, the inclusion of the due
consideration requirement in CETA surely expressed some congressional intent that prime sponsors not cut off effective programs without granting at least some minimum procedures. There was no indication in the Act or the regulations that the requirement was less relevant
to a transfer of programs from an effective subcontractor to the prime

"4One of these five allegations did not raise any questions concerning the prime
sponsor's program operation.
35
This statement should not be misunderstood as an attack on the integrity or competence of the regional office. The EEC findings from the 1979 fiscal year indicate that the
regional office was quite willing and able to enforce CETA law against prime sponsors in
order to prevent injustice. The regional office overturned seven prime sponsor decisions
during the 1979 fiscal year.
These seven cases do not qualify the conclusions asserted in text because, in our
judgment, a decision affirming the prime sponsor would not have been reasonable in any
of the cases.
36
The grievance was filed before the effective date of the 1978 amendments to CETA.
Before these amendments, the Act had required the revocation of the funding of a prime
sponsor who failed "to give due consideration to continued funding of programs of
demonstrated effectiveness." Act of Dec. 28, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, § 108(d)(3),
[1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (87 Stat.) 936. The amended CETA statute also
gave the Secretary discretion to terminate financial assistance to prime sponsors for their
failure to give such due consideration. 29 U.S.C. § 816(c)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
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sponsor than to a transfer from one subcontractor to another subcontractor.
On the other hand, the regional office's decision to accept the prime
sponsor's resolution of the complaint may reflect a desire not to give
leverage to subcontractors to control prime sponsor programs. The
regional office could have reasonably determined that the ETA's exercise of executive discretion should engender the only outside influence
on such prime sponsor policy decisions as whether to subcontract
program delivery. 7
The regional office's unwillingness to accept reasonable, but questionable interpretations or applications of CETA law suggested by
parties from outside ETA also is evidenced by the regional office's
written communications in the three individual prime sponsor reading
files which we examined. These files indicate that when a prime sponsor asked whether a certain course of action was permitted by the Act,
the regional office was more likely to interpret an ambiguous regulation not to permit the action. As stated above, we counted seven
regional office letters in the reading files which reject one reasonable
interpretation of the Act by accepting another reasonable interpretation. In each case, the reasonable interpretation rejected was that
which would have permitted the course of action suggested by the
prime sponsor. We found no instances in which the regional office
37
1n another decision, the regional office affirmed a prime sponsor's conclusion that
one of its project operators did not have to design its project to enable it to enroll the
maximum number of the most severely disadvantaged public service employment (PSE)
applicants. The complainant argued that the regulations mandated such accommodations by dictating that "[w]ithin a PSE program, preference in enrollment shall be given
to those who are the most severely disadvantaged in terms of length of unemployment
and their prospects for finding unsubsidized employment." 20 C.F.R. § 676.30a(b)(l)
(1980). The regional office exercised its emphatic discretion to recommend that the
prime sponsor give greater priority to projects which could utilize the skills of its most
severely disadvantaged population. But the regional office refused to interpret the
regulations to require prime sponsors and their project agents to design projects which
will afford maximum PSE opportunities to the most severely disadvantaged.
This refusal was reasonable. Since the regulation provided that preference shall be
given to the most severely disadvantaged "[w]ithin a PSE program," astrong case can be
made that the Secretary did not intend that the preference affect the nature of the
programs and the skills which they require. Moreover, interpreting CETA law to permit
challenges to prime sponsor PSE projects by disadvantaged applicants who cannot meet
project skill requirements could have led to restrictions of prime sponsor flexibility which
ETA might otherwise have viewed as not desirable. However, acontrary legal interpretation also would have been reasonable. The qualifying phrase "[w]ithin a PSE program" is
ambiguous, and in any event, was not included in the critical statutory language of
section 122(b)(l)(A) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). In addition,
requiring prime sponsors to design projects to serve the most severely disadvantaged
would maximally have advanced the purpose of at least the particular statutory provision
being interpreted.
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committed the ETA to accepting some prime sponsor activity which
could be questioned seriously under CETA law.
An example should again be helpful. In one letter the regional office
interpreted the regulatory command that each prime sponsor give
"equitable" service to "significant segments of the eligible population."38 The letter concludes that the regional office would not
support the prime sponsor's proposed Title II-D program for welfare
recipients because the program did not serve equitably the various
political jurisdictions under the prime sponsor's charge. 9 The letter
thus interpreted the regulatory command to require equitable service
between geographic segments of the prime sponsor's population, as
well as between age, race, sex, and national origin segments. This
interpretation is appealing; it prevented this prime sponsor from gaining approval of a program which would have favored, apparently
without justification, selected political jurisdictions. However, the interpretation certainly was not mandated by the regulations. The regulations mentioned "age, race, sex, and national origin" as divisional
criteria for "significant segments.. 4 . Nowhere was geography or political jurisdiction mentioned as a divisional criterion. The letter cites
nothing in the regulations or the Act or its legislative history to support
the office's application of the equitable service command to the prime
sponsor proposal.4
The regional office's tendency to reject debatable interpretations of
CETA law suggested in prime sponsor inquiries to regional officers
38

See 20.C.F.R. § 676.54 (1980).
"The prime sponsor was a state government responsible for all political jurisdictions
within its boundaries which had not qualified to be independent prime sponsors. See 29
U.S.C. § 811 (Supp. IV 1980).
4
See 20 C.F.R. § 676.54(1980). See also 29 U.S.C. § 823(a)( 1) (Supp. IV 1980) (proscribing discrimination by several additional suspect criteria, but not including geography or
political jurisdiction).
"'In another letter, the regional office advised a prime sponsor that a three-month
summer vacation period during which teacher aids were enrolled in a public service
employment program but do not receive wages, counted toward the thirty months within
five years CETA participation limit specified in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 676.30(f)
(1980). This interpretation was certainly not unreasonable, and can be supported, as was
done in the letter, by contrasting the thirty-month limit with another section of the CETA
regulations which proscribed the receipt of CETA public service employment wages for
more than 78 weeks during a five-year period. 20 C.ER. § 676.30(d) (1980). However,
another, and less restrictive, interpretation of the thirty-month limitation and its consistency with the seventy-eight-week limitation was possible: the seventy-eight-week
limitation applies only to active participation in public service employment, while the
thirty-month limitation applies to active participation in all CETA programs. Congress
may have intended to limit the duration of individuals' dependency on CETA programs,
regardless of the duration of their active participation in the programs. But since this
intention was not clearly expressed in the Act or the regulations, the regional office's
interpretation was not absolutely necessary.
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may seem inconsistent with the regional office's tendency also to reject
debatable interpretations of CETA law suggested by third party complaints. The first tendency had the effect of permitting arguably
appropriate prime sponsor activity, while the second tendency had the
effect of restricting arguably appropriate prime sponsor activity. I will
attempt to explain these seemingly contradictory permissive and restrictive tendencies in the last section of this paper.42
Here, I should note that the regional solicitor opinions directed to
the regional office during the 1979 fiscal year seem to reflect a tendency to interpret the CETA regulations liberally. Of the twenty opinion
letters delivered, we counted four which ultimately could have influenced the delivery of CETA programs in New England and which
also required the solicitor's office to choose between more than one
reasonable interpretation of the regulations. In all four of these cases,
the regional solicitor advised the regional office on how it should
respond to some prime sponsor-initiated or proposed action; the solicitor did not assist the office in the resolution of a third party complaint
in any of these cases. Yet, in each case, the regional solicitor chose a
permissive interpretation of the regulations.43 In the last section of this
paper, I will also explain this ostensibly contradictory tendency."
The study's third principal conclusion is that the regional office
independently attempted to affect CETA programs delivered by
prime sponsors primarily through decisions to emphasize certain goals
or requirements of CETA and what the office viewed as the best or
preferred means to achieve these goals. The regional office less fre4

See text accompanying note 59 infra.
"For instance, in one letter, the regional solicitor advised the regional administrator
(RA) that a prime sponsor could contract with a private profit-making firm to provide
intake and assessment services for a public service employment (PSE) program. The
solicitor interpreted section 98.27(c) of the old CETA regulations which allowed prime
sponsor contracts with private profit-making businesses only for the provision of "administrative services." 42 Fed. Reg. 55770 (1977). The Solicitor stated that "administrative services" could be construed to include intake and assessment. This construction,
while surely not unreasonable, was not necessary; "administrative services" could have
been limited to narrower management functions, such as cost accounting or publicity,
not related to program operation.
"See text accompanying note 63 infra. Our review of the regional office's 1979 fiscal
year audit resolutions did not reveal any significant exercise of discretion relevant to this
second conclusion. Indeed, we did not evaluate closely the decisions of the office
reflected in these audits because none of the audit decisions could be expected to have
any direct effect on the delivery of CETA programs in New England. The audits all
focused on the prime sponsors' financial accounting, management, and administrative
assistance. None of the final audit determinations, or the earlier reports from the
Department's independent auditors, question expenditures because of the quality, effectiveness or nature of any program. Nor did any report question a prime sponsor's
participant eligibility criteria.
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quently attempted to influence prime sponsors through interpretations or further formulations of the actual requirements or proscriptions of CETA. In terms of the typology of executive discretion which I
set forth above, 45 the regional office attempted to make more significant use of the second type of discretion, emphatic discretion, than it
did of the first type of discretion, interpretive or lawmaking discretion.
My discussion of both of the first two principal conclusions suggested that the regional office was not anxious to formulate new
interpretations or requirements of CETA law. I stressed in the discussion of the first conclusion that there were very few instances during
the 1979 fiscal year in which the regional office independently pronounced an interpretation except when it was forced by a prime
sponsor or a third party complainant to apply the law to a particular
problem. And in the discussion of the second conclusion, I emphasized
that the regional office preferred applying existing law in a straightforward manner and resisted any external suggestions for new developments in the law. However, our study discovered that the regional
office was not so hesitant to use emphatic discretion to influence prime
sponsor program delivery in two ways.
First, the regional office communicated to all prime sponsors or to
particular prime sponsors that they should concentrate on the achievement of particular CETA goals or compliance with particular CETA
requirements, without in any way refining the meaning of these goals
or requirements. As noted above, such emphatic communications were
included in twenty-one of the twenty-six fiscal year 1979 general programmatic regional office communications transmitted to all prime
sponsors.46 For instance, during 1979 many emphatic communications
underscored the importance of particular youth programs, such as
programs including general education components for dropouts;
others stressed particular CETA youth goals, such as meeting targeted
participant levels.
The selected prime sponsor reading files indicate that the regional
office was even more likely to transmit letters emphasizing particular
CETA goals or requirements to individual prime sponsors, usually in
response to a regional office perception that the prime sponsor could
and should be doing more to achieve the goal or meet the requirement.
Of the 190 letters in the reading files reviewed, we counted almost 120
which in some manner stress a particular CETA goal or requirement
4

See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.

46

Nineteen of these general communications to all prime sponsors were regional letters
from the Region One Letters Series; the other communications were telegrams to all
prime sponsors from the files of middle-level regional officials.
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without elaborating the meaning of that goal or requirement. Some of
these letters express regional office priorities by simply stating or
alluding to particular requirements of the law and noting that these
requirements may be applicable to a problem which the sponsor
confronts. 7 Another large group of letters expresses regional office
priorities by requesting from the prime sponsors information relevant
to particular programs or requirements.48
A third group of letters comments on one of the "master" or
"annual" program "plans" which CETA reqjires prime sponsors to
submit for ETA approval.49 Review of the plans required the regional
office to determine which aspects of program operation it wished to
emphasize for each prime sponsor. At least in fiscal year 1979, the
regional office generally provided emphasis by simply noting how
certain components of particular plans were deficient without refining
the regulations to insist upon specific corrections. For example, one
letter asks a prime sponsor to explain why the eligible minority population listed in its annual plan declined during the year, and requests that
the prime sponsor inform the regional office of the further action
which it proposes to take on two issues noted in its master plan, the
difficulty of meeting the CETA public service employment average
wage limitation" and a transformation of the prime sponsors' personnel system.
A fourth group of letters in the three prime sponsor reading files
announces the results or implications of a regional office review or
evaluation of the prime sponsors' programs. These letters also express
the regional office'sjudgments of which CETA goals and requirements
should receive the evaluated prime sponsor's primary attention at a
particular time period. For instance, one letter stresses that the regional office had found that the prime sponsor had fallen substantially
below the record of most prime sponsors in placing the recipients of its
services in unsubsidized employment. This letter, without expressing
any judgment on the meaning of a CETA regulation, might have
influenced the prime sponsor to give greater priority to the placement
goal relative to other CETA goals, such as service to the most economi7

A number of these letters actually may have been transmitted to impress the national
office, or even the general public, more than to influence the prime sponsors to whom
they were addressed. It was thus not possible for us to judge how seriously these letters
were taken by prime sponsors without interviewing local government officials.
"8For example, some letters request that a prime sponsor investigate and provide
information on possible substitution of CETA positions for those job opportunities
"which would otherwise be available" in violation of maintenance of service commands of
the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 823(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
"9See 29 U.S.C. § 813 (Supp. IV 1980).
50See 29 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
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cally disadvantaged or to all significant segments of the unemployed
population?"
Our study concluded that the regional office influenced prime sponsor program delivery in a second manner by exercising emphatic
discretion. All of the classifications of regional office letters discussed in
the last few pages also included instances of the regional office suggesting to a particular prime sponsor that it initiate certain actions which,
while perhaps not required by CETA, may have been necessary to
show that the sponsor was making adequate efforts to achieve one of
the relatively vague goals of the Act. These instances illustrate how the
regional office could suggest that a prime sponsor shift its program
operations in order to escape the office's special scrutiny without
announcing that such a shift was actually required by the Act or that a
failure to make the shift would necessarily constitute a violation of
CETA's provisions.
For example, one of the regional letters from the RILS strongly
suggests that all New England prime sponsors take a course of action
which the regional office expressly admits was not required by the Act.
This letter asks prime sponsors voluntarily to include a section on
planned public information activities as an addition to their 1980 fiscal
year annual plans. The letter acknowledges that the law did not require
prime sponsors to submit public information plans, but it states that "it
is our intention to stress such action as a regular policy in the hope that
prime sponsors will see the value of this exercise and voluntarily
52
comply.
In one EEC finding and determination, the regional office even
recommends a greater prime sponsor effort to meet a CETA goal after
dismissing a complaint that the sponsor had violated CETA by failing
to make the recommended effort. In this determination the regional
office affirmed a prime sponsor's conclusion that one of its project
operators did not have to design its project to enroll the maximum
number of most severely disadvantaged public service employment
applicants. The regional office exercised its discretion to recommend
that the prime sponsor give greater priority to projects which could
utilize the skills of its most severely disadvantaged population. But the
regional office refused to interpret the regulation to require prime
sponsors and their project agents to design projects which afford
5
Any employment training program operator knows it is easier to train and place in
unsubsidized employment the "cream" of the unemployed population and more difficult
to place the most disadvantaged, including significant segments like poorly educated
minorities.
5
Letter from Timothy M. Barnicle, Regional Administrator for Employment and
Training, to all CETA prime sponsors (No. 120-79).
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maximum public service employment opportunities to the most severely disadvantaged. 3
An internally consistent picture of the regional office's exercise of
executive discretion was the fourth conclusion to emerge from our
study. The most important aspects of this picture were provided by
letters contained in the reading files from the regional office to individual prime sponsors. The EEC unit's findings and determinations on
formal allegations, the final audit determinations which we examined,
and the regional solicitor's opinions given to the regional administrator, all reflect regional office exercise of interpretive discretion. Notwithstanding some important exceptions, the exercise of discretion
displayed in these documents could not have affected directly either
the nature of CETA programs delivered in Region One or the recipients or delivery agents of these programs.
Regional letters of the RILS transmitted to all New England prime
sponsors in the 1979 fiscal year contain examples of the exercise of
both emphatic and interpretive or lawmaking discretion. But the programmatic impact of these examples was probably limited in comparison to the cumulative impact of the numerous letters sent by Region
One to individual prime sponsors stressing various CETA goals or
interpreting various CETA requirements. Although most of the reading file letters were transmitted to only one prime sponsor, the impact
of most of these letters was probably increased by the reference to a
specific problem facing the particular prime sponsor to whom they
were addressed.
The importance of the reading files is consistent with our conclusions. A regional office which generally does not exercise its interpretive or lawmaking discretionary authority, except when obliged to do
so by the need to resolve specific factual problems, will be most likely to
express its authority through officials who work closely with prime
sponsors on specific problems. And a regional office which prefers to
influence CETA programs by emphasizing certain CETA goals or
requirements rather than by committing itself to some further requirements, will be likely to exert its influence by evaluating particular prime
sponsor problems and by suggesting what specific prime sponsors
4
should do to best meet the goals of the Act.5
5

For a fuller description of this example, see note 37 supra.
"4Two limitations of the study need not place qualifications on the study's conclusions.
First, analysis of oral communications between the regional office and prime sponsors, if
not impossible, was clearly beyond the scope of the study's time and resources. We could
not, for example, expect regional officials to reconstruct telephone calls with prime
sponsors. However, if significant pronouncements were formally relayed to prime

EXECUTIVE DISCRETION

581

II. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE STUDY
The picture of executive discretion presented by the study is understandable as well as internally consistent. The behavior of regional
officers revealed by the study was both rational, given the personal
organizational interests of the officers, and functional for the ETA
55
bureaucracy of which these officers were a part.
For instance, the regional office's revealed disinclination to make any
discretionary decisions except in response to concrete, specific factual
problems, controversies or questions can be described as an example of
a public bureaucracy's preference for incremental rather than compre-

sponsors either over the telephone, in conference, sessions or in person, such pronouncements presumably would have been of a similar nature and type as those contained in the regional office's written communications. Moreover, any variance would
only be likely to provide additional support for the report's principal conclusions,
especially on the relative importance of emphatic discretion. Regional officers stated to
us that oral communications from the regional office may have had much more influence
on prime sponsors than written communications, but they agreed that oral communications to prime sponsors would have been even less likely than written communications to
articulate a new regional office policy for all prime sponsors or to provide a new
refinement of the specific requirements of CETA law, at least without a subsequent
written confirmation. Regional officials might have responded to particular prime sponsor problems by offering influential oral suggestions on how improvements in programs
could be made, but such responses would represent an exercise of the emphatic discretionary authority which we conclude was most important to the regional office.
The other, probably nonserious limitation on our study was its timing. Passage of
major revisions in CETA in October 1978, see Act of Oct. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-524,
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (92 Stat. 1909), made it inevitable that at least the
first months of the 1979 fiscal year would not be typical months for the administration of
CETA. On the one hand, CETA regional office staff was probably confronted with an
unusually high number of requests from prime sponsors for interpretations of the new
CETA law. On the other hand, regional office personnel may have been more hesitant to
forge new elaborations of the requirements of the law until the national office had more
of an opportunity to signal the directions which it wanted to take under a revised CETA.
The regional office may have had less of an opportunity to formulate any general policy
not in response to specific prime sponsor problems and the office may have been
particularly hesitant to formulate any interpretations of CETA law which would sacrifice
any of ETA's flexibility in the first months after passage of major amendments to the law.
However, it is not likely that the study's conclusions were distorted by the passage of the
new CETA legislation in the fall of 1978 given the similarity of the findings for the second
half of the 1979 fiscal year to the findings for the first half of the 1979 fiscal year. We did
find that the regional office was productive of more significant written documents during
the second half of the fiscal year, perhaps because its routine was less disrupted by the
transition to the new statute. However, the second half of the fiscal year did not present a
different qualitative picture of the office's exercise of discretion.
5
In order to understand any social reality, we must be ready to analyze the consequences of phenomena as well as their origins. See R. K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE

19-84 (rev. ed. 1957). We therefore should seek to determine what

social functions are served by institutional processes and structures.
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hensive decisionmaking.5 6 Administrators, and especially relatively
low-level administrators, have good reason to avoid abstract comprehensive policy choices. Such choices, whether made simply by emphasizing certain goals or by interpreting a statute to elevate those goals,
perforce require the ranking of values which have not been ranked
expressly by the electorate, by elected officials, or by the administrators' superiors.57 Such rankings are difficult and rendering them exposes lower-level officials to substantial risks of rejection. Applying
conflicting values to individual problems is not as difficult or administratively dangerous because such applications require only the consideration of marginal impacts. 8 Furthermore, officials with limited
administrative resources who are otherwise disinclined to make deferable comprehensive decisions can easily defer such decisions further by
responding to the crises or deadlines imposed by individual problems.
An understandable desire to eschew bringing controversy to the
attention of superiors in Washington in part also explains the behavior
summarized in the study's second conclusion: the regional office
avoided committing ETA to any fairly challengeable new interpretation or formulation of CETA law suggested by parties outside ETA.
Clearly the regional office's straightforward and not fairly challengeable applications of CETA regulations were not likely to generate
problems for regional officers. More interesting, the desire of lowerlevel officials to avoid bringing controversy to the attention of their
superiors provides one explanation for the ostensible contradiction
between the regional office's tendency to reject the legality of fairly
questionable actions suggested by prime sponsors and the office's
tendency to accept the legality of third-party-challenged and fairly
questionable initiatives actually taken by prime sponsors.
On the one hand, when a prime sponsor asked a regional officer
whether a particular proposed course of action was permitted, a restrictive interpretation of the Act was less likely than a liberal interpretation to cause controversy with ETA officials at the national office.
A liberal interpretation might have encouraged a prime sponsor action
of which the national office would disapprove, whereas a prime sponsor's failure to take some questionable action probably never would
have come to the national office's attention. Regional officers acknowl'See Lindbolm, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959);
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBOLM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION; POLICY EVALUATION AS A

SOCIAL PROCESS (1962); R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
(1963).
57
See LINDBOLM, supra note 56.
58
1d.
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edged to us that saying "no" to a prime sponsor generally ended a
problem, while saying "yes" could have created controversy if the
prime sponsor proceeded to take the questionable action.
On the other hand, the denial of relief to a third party complainant
was less likely than a corrective action order against a prime sponsor to
cause controversy with the ETA national office. Acceptance of a third
party complaint was acceptance of a charge of misfeasance against part
of the CETA system for which ETA had oversight responsibility. A
denial of the charge was a defense of that system. In addition, regional
officers agreed with our assessment that prime sponsors generally were
more likely than third party grievants to appeal regional office findings
by seeking an administrative hearing from the national office, 59 if not a
political hearing through their Congressional delegation."
While the avoidance of controversy was a rational goal for individual
officials, service of this goal would not necessarily have assisted the
ETA to achieve the goals of CETA; although controversy may drain
administrative resources, skewing decisions to avoid controversy may
have even more significant costs to the society served by the decision.
However, the significant regional office discretionary behavior described by our study can be further explained as serving a function
which may be more fully consistent with ETA's institutional charge to
implement CETA effectively and justly. The most important connecting thread among all of the study's three principal conclusions seems to
be a rational and functional regional office resistance to sacrificing
ETA's control over CETA.
Generally, the discretion granted to an executive office under a
statute is greatest immediately after the statute's passage. The executive's discretion, not only to interpret the statute, but also to set priorities for its enforcement, becomes more confined as the executive office
itself refines the statute's requirements. An executive office's formulation of more specific requirements inevitably eliminates the possibility
of alternative requirements; and whenever a statutory scheme permits
aggrieved third parties to influence implementation priorities, the
third parties' capacity for doing so is enhanced by having more specific
"Such hearings could have been requested by complainants as well as prime sponsors
who
6 were dissatisfied with the regional office resolution. See 20 C.F.R. § 67688 (1980).
See Diver, supra note 22, at 284-85. Diver suggests that the relative leniency of
administrative investigators is influenced by their desire to avoid controversy before
their superiors. He postulates that those officials whose leniency is not likely to result in a
catastrophic mistake, such as a nuclear power disaster, are more likely "to err on the side
of leniency in the absence of externally supplied motivation" because rigidity is more
likely to be challenged by the regulated party than is leniency by a third-party complainant. Id.

584

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

requirements to invoke. Of course, an executive office can change the
law which it develops under a statute, and the office can change its
interpretation of legislative commands. But in most cases the expectations and reliance of affected parties, as well as institutional inertia,
make each change more and more difficult and a reviewing court's
scrutiny of executive lawmaking will increase directly with executive
inconsistency."
Our study indicates that ETA regional officials were inclined to
attempt to break the evolutionary refinement of the CETA law for
which they were responsible. Thus, the study concludes that the regional office seldom formulated new general and confining refinements of CETA law when not forced to do so by specific problems or
questions. The study also concludes that the regional office attempted
to affect CETA programs less through the application of legal requirements which could confine future ETA discretion than by emphasizing
the importance of selected CETA goals, requirements, or strategies.
The exercise of emphatic discretion does not have a confining effect on
executive officers. Emphatic discretion is exercised within the bounds
of the law previously created by the legislature and the executive. Since
the exercise of discretion does not change these bounds, it does not
narrow them for the future. There generally is nojudicial review of the
emphasis of priorities or of suggestions not enforced as specific legal
requirements.
The study's other principal conclusion-that the regional office
avoided committing ETA to fairly challengable new interpretations of
CETA law suggested by parties outside CETA-is also more understandable when viewed as resistance to sacrificing ETA's control over
CETA. When so viewed, the office's tendency to reject the legality of
prime sponsor-proposed questionable activities can be reconciled
further with the office's tendency to accept the legality of questionable
prime sponsor activities actually challenged by third party-grievants.
On the one hand, restrictive interpretations of CETA law in response to preliminary prime sponsor inquiries should have been less
likely than liberal responses to reduce ETA's emphatic discretion to
influence prime sponsor programs. A restrictive regional office response to a prime sponsor inquiry did not mean that the office would
actually attempt to enforce the law against a prime sponsor which did
not heed the office's legal position. After a restrictive response to a
prime sponsor's question, ETA regained its emphatic discretion either
to enforce the law against a recalcitrant prime sponsor or to be lenient
"See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974).
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if it wished to deemphasize the goal toward which the requirement was
directed. In contrast, when ETA approved a course of action proposed
by a prime sponsor, it sacrificed for at least some period of time its
emphatic discretion to control that action.
On the other hand, a formulation of CETA law which imposed
further obligations on prime sponsors in response to a complaint from
a third party effectively sacrificed to the third party some of ETA's
discretion to determine how CETA programs could best be implemented. Every clear legal obligation of prime sponsors which could
be invoked by grievants gave third parties some control over determining how and when CETA law should be enforced.62 Third party use of
this control could have interfered with ETA's attempts to influence
prime sponsors to emphasize the goals or requirements which ETA
deemed most important at a particular time. A decision which refused
to formulate any further prime sponsor duty did establish precedent
against a later restrictive formulation; any legal resolution of a complaint must do as much. However, rejection of the third party complaint at least preserved the influence of ETA's emphatic discretion
without committing ETA not to develop the law later. In a somewhat
different situation at a later date, the ETA, under its own priorities
rather than those of third parties, could still decide to develop and
enforce CETA law in the direction which the grievant wished to take
earlier."
This reconciliation of the two ostensibly contradictory tendencies
revealed in the individual prime sponsor reading files and the EEC
findings and determinations is consistent with the evidence from the
regional solicitor opinion letter files, which indicates that the regional
solicitor did not share the tendency of the ETA regional office to resist
approving prime sponsor-proposed activity which could be questioned
legally. The regional solicitor's office not only did not bear the final
responsibility for CETA programs in the region, but also should not
have been concerned about exercising and thus preserving any empha62
Restrictive ETA responses to prime sponsor inquiries concerning the legality of
proposed action presumably did not establish a clear legal standard invocable by thirdparty grievants. Indeed, it is doubtful that any potential third-party grievants would even
have known of.the existence of these responses. ETA did not publish them.
63
The thesis that regional officials attempted to avoid sacrificing ETA's control over
CETA also generally accords with other studies of bureaucratic behavior. For instance,
J. M. Prottas concluded from his studies of a variety of "street level bureaucrats," ranging
from welfare workers to public housing managers and to hospital emergency room
clerks, that the official behavior of these public bureaucrats can be explained at least in
part by their desire to achieve autonomy in theirjobs and to control the order and pace of
their work. See PROrrAS, supra note 22, at 9, 111-113 (1979). Prottas draws from the
influential work of J. G. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958).
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tic discretion to influence CETA programs. Such discretion was for the
regional office and not the office's lawyers. The regional solicitor's
office's major institutional concern probably was the avoidance of
litigation, and this goal would be served by flexible, accommodating
responses to prime sponsor legal inquiries passed to the solicitor by
ETA.
Understood as demonstrating reasonable efforts to maintain ETA
control over CETA, the regional office behavior described in the study
was fully consistent with ETA's charge to implement CETA effectively.
Neither the Department of Labor nor concerned citizens should be
disturbed by the study. Indeed, the study may suggest that at least
under certain conditions some tendencies of administrative offices
accord well with the public interest. Two major criticisms might be
made of the regional office's efforts to avoid the confinement of ETA
discretion, but both criticisms can be countered.
Some might stress the costs of the regional office's husbanding of
discretion by arguing that any discretion preserved is discretion potentially to be abused. Professor Davis, for instance, advocates as great a
refinement of the law as possible in order to insure that executive
officials will not favor some interests or parties for improper reasons.'
In his view, more refined rules means more law and more law means
greater justice. Professor Davis therefore might conclude that the
national office should have made greater efforts to limit the regional
office's discretion with more refined rules, because the study indicates a
regional office resistance to doing so itself.
I do not conclude that this study would demand in future ETA
systems greater confinement of regional office discretion to avoid the
abuse of that discretion. In the first place, we found no instances in
which the regional office either attempted to influence a prime sponsor
to take action inconsistent with the Act or subordinated the Act's
purpose or congressional intent to the preservation of ETA power.
Moreover, we found no evidence of favoritism or inconsistent treatment of prime sponsors. 65 Furthermore, I question whether unin-

"See

K.

DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

(1969). Others might

consider any use of emphatic discretion to be an abuse of executive discretion because it is
not limited by "law," at least as idealistically defined. See for instance the influential
J. 65
LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM ch. 5 (1969).
Indeed, we did not detect any differences in the three reading files which reflect any
contrasting administrative styles of the various responsible regional officials. The letters
in each of the prime sponsor files are strikingly similar. The letters in all three files fit
roughly in the same proportion into the categories discussed previously. All the files
contain similar evaluation letters, the only difference being the particular deficiencies
highlighted in the three different sponsors' operation.
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tended, somewhat variant treatment of prime sponsors was necessarily
a significant problem. Unlike private firms in a regulated industry,
prime sponsors generally did not compete against each other and thus
were not especially disadvantaged when treated differently. 6
Second, regional office discretion, to use the vocabulary of Professor
Davis, had already been significantly "structured," "checked," and
"confined" at the time of the study.17 It had been structured because
CETA regulations provided a fair and open complaint hearing process
for any party which was adversely affected by an ETA decision.
Regional office discretion was checked because parties who were dissatisfied with regional office final decisions could obtain formal review in
the courts.66 And the discretion was even confined by fairly specific
published regulations and national office policy statements in field
memoranda. Of course, more refinement of the CETA rules would
have confined ETA discretion more, and would have made any structuring and checking of that discretion more meaningful. But further
general restrictions of regional office discretion should have turned on
an evaluation of the benefits of ETA's emphatic discretion, because the
social costs of this discretion do not seem significant.
Consideration of the benefits of ETA's emphatic discretion suggests
the second criticism that might be made of regional office avoidance of
the confinement of ETA discretion. Some might argue that ETA could
not influence prime sponsors effectively by exercising emphatic discretion, and therefore, should have used rather than husbanded its interpretive or lawmaking discretion. I think everyone would grant that at
least some legal flexibility afforded ETA a greater capacity to respond
to changing prime sponsor problems. But some might contend that the
mere stress of particular selected CETA goals or even the recommendation of particular solutions to individual prime sponsor problems would not, without the articulation of a legal requirement, have
influenced prime sponsor program delivery significantly.
Inasmuch as our study did not attempt to determine whether prime
sponsors actually changed their programs after regional office communications suggesting change, I cannot make assertions concerning
the actual importance of the regional office's emphatic discretion to the
delivery of CETA programs in New England. However, I suspect that
'Cf. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (considering whether the
Federal Trade Commission must postpone the operation of a valid cease and desist order
against a single firm until similar orders have been enforced against the firm's competitors).
67
See K. DAVIS, supra note 64, especially chs. 3, 4 and 5.
'See 20 C.F.R. § 676.81.93 (1980).
6929 U.S.C. § 817 (Supp. IV 1980).
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programs were affected substantially by regional office suggestions
because prime sponsors were sensitive to how ETA might concentrate
its further investigation and enforcement efforts. Moreover, regional
officers provide us with additional reasons why prime sponsors might
have been responsive to regional office suggestions. First, prime sponsors knew that the regional office could significantly influence the
national office's allocation of the secretary's discretionary money."0
Second, the regional office could embarrass, or at least threaten to
embarrass, prime sponsors through sensitive use of the press. Release
to the press of an important negative evaluation of a program or a
decision to disallow some CETA expenditures could impose political
costs on a sponsor which would not have been recouped by any later
successful defense against an ETA enforcement action.7
Perhaps more important, prime sponsor officials probably would
have responded to suggestive policy and program leads from ETA,
even when they did not fear displeasing ETA officials. To a significant
degree, local prime sponsor bureaucracies were extensions of the
ETA, subordinate parts of the total CETA system. Theorists of
bureaucracy have stressed the importance of rules to the control of
subordinate officials by their superiors." However, students of
bureaucracies have also recognized that with limited use of scarce
bureaucratic incentives (such as CETA discretionary funds or press
statements) supervisory bureaucrats can efficiently direct subordinate
officials who share their values and "sense of mission" concerning
institutional goals.73 These students have emphasized that bureaucrats,
like other humans, wish to "actualize" their own values and are influenced in their development of values by the groups with whom they
share an identification.74
I suspect that CETA officials employed by prime sponsors identified
strongly with ETA officials as employment training professionals, and
7

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 842(f)(2)(C); 855(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
Cf. Hawkins, supra note 26, at 24-27 (British pollution control officers employ
publicity for deterrent value and allocate to cooperative companies benefits such as
assistance with permit applications). The use of publicity to embarrass a prime sponsor
might also have created unwanted controversy for regional officers who do not wish to
catch the attention of national officers. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. However, in many cases the threat of negative publicity can be as influential as the actual
publicity. Moreover, negative publicity probably is not as likely to engage the attention of
superiors as is a contested legal interpretation.
72
See, e.g., A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 59-61 (1966); M. WEBER,THETTHEORY OF
7

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

"See, e.g., J. Q.

329-332 (Henderson and Parsons trans., 1947).

13-14 (1978) (study of Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration).
74See, e.g., PROTTAS, supra note 22, at 111, 116-119.
WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS
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that they generally shared the values of ETA officials and their sense of
mission concerning the ultimate goals of CETA. Although certain
issues, such as the use of CETA personnel to replace otherwise regularly employed workers, or deciding whether to hire more disadvantaged rather than more easily trainable workers,75 may have brought
local governmental CETA administrators into conflict with ETA officials, the concerns of local and federal CETA officials on most issues
should have been similar. Even local officials who did not fear the
exercise of ETA power normally should have considered carefully any
question concerning some program problem raised by a national official."6 And if those local officials, like many officials, were simply looking for a satisfactory rather than an optimal solution to the problem,77 a
national office suggestion probably would have determined the prime
sponsor response.
When regulated officials, like prime sponsor CETA administrators,
share the values and general sense of mission of their federal regulators, even federal emphasis of general and perhaps vague aspirational
goals is likely to influence the regulated officials. I agree with those who
have questioned the effectiveness of statutory directives made to regulated parties requiring them to do the best that they can to achieve
goals about which the regulated parties at best do not care and at worst
are antagonistic." But when the objects of federal aspirational directives do share the goals toward which they are to aspire, it is reasonable
to assume that the federal administrator's emphasis of certain goals
would influence the priorities of the regulated parties. Thus, federal
emphasis on the operation of youth programs funded by CETA9 is
likely to influence most prime sponsors to concentrate more of their
limited attention on achieving the accepted, but vague, aspirational
75

See note 51 supra.
March and Simon proposed that the influence of a group on the development of an
individual's goals will be a function of five factors, each of which indicates that the ETA
should have had great influence on the goals of prime sponsor administrators.]. MARCH
& H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 65-66 (1958). First, ETA officials could be expected to have
had substantial prestige for prime sponsor administrators. Second, prime sponsor administrators could be expected to have perceived that their basic values were shared by
ETA officers. Third, ETA and prime sponsor officials frequently interacted. Fourth,
ETA officials were in a position to satisfy material and psychological needs of prime
sponsor administrators. And fifth, the prime sponsor and ETA officers were not in
normal, significant competition.
"On the concept of "satisficing" in organizational behavior, see H. SIMON, MODELS OF
MAN 204 (1957). See also H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1976), especially
ch. 5.
78
See Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of
Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978).
Aspirational
79
See text accompanying note 46 supra.
76
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goal of improving the "future employability" of economically disadvantaged youth."0 Since leading participants "to the maximum extent practicable" to placement in employment which enables them "to
become economically self sufficient"'" is also presumably accepted as a
goal by prime sponsor officials, federal emphasis on placement in
nonsubsidizedjobs 2 is also likely to influence prime sponsor priorities.
If my presumption that ETA could influence prime sponsors significantly through the exercise of emphatic discretion is correct, then
regional office efforts to avoid the confinement of ETA authority are
not only rational for regional officers, but also fully consistent with the
ETA's principal charge to insure the operation of an effective and fair
employment training system in this nation. The picture of discretionary behavior presented by our study is neither mysterious nor
disturbing.83
Nonetheless, the study does have two implications for future policymaking in federal-state programs like CETA. On the one hand, if
federal policymakers wish to insure that decentralized grant statutes
like CETA are implemented consistently throughout the nation, the
top policymakers should make clear the priorities between goals and
between varying strategies for reaching these goals which they wish
subordinate federal officials to urge on state and local officials. Our
study does not indicate that the national ETA office did not attempt to
set general priorities; indeed, an exercise of emphatic discretion by the
national office is expressed in many of the national office field memoranda which we found were relayed without change by the regional
office to prime sponsors. 4 However, the study does indicate that
emphatic discretion was important to the regional office, and if the
national office wished to exercise greater control over regional of5
ficials, it should have controlled that discretion to a greater extent.
8

See 29 U.S.C. § 891 (Supp. 1978).
"1See 29 U.S.C. §823(f)(3) (Supp. 1978).
8
See text accompanying note 51 supra.
8
See Veljanovski, Economic Aspects of the Enforcement of British Factory Legislation
(1981) (unpublished paper on file in my office) for a study of why an executive office
might rationally prefer to deal with an overinclusive statute through the exercise of its
selective enforcement (emphatic discretion) authority rather than through rule specification (interpretive or lawmaking discretion).
"See note 27 supra.
85
There are of course limits on the extent to which the national office conceivably could
have wanted to or would have been able to establish general CETA priorities in any way
which would have obviated any exercise of emphatic discretion by regional officers. For
instance, it may have been impossible for the national office to articulate any abstract
priorities between two legitimate but potentially conflicting goals, such as positive placement of CETA participants and equitable service to significant segments of the popula-
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On the other hand, if top federal policymakers wish to encourage
experimentation by state and local officials with particular kinds of
programs which might be questioned under some provision of a grant
statute like CETA, our study suggests that the policymakers should
make clear that such programs are in fact legally and politically acceptable. The study suggests that the ETA regional office resisted committing ETA to the approval of any prime sponsor activity which might
be questioned. This resistance, while understandable and generally
consistent with ETA's responsibilities, must in some cases have discouraged prime sponsor program experimentation, and any such
discouragement may well have been viewed as unfortunate by the
national office. Many laws, including some CETA provisions and regulations, express the resolution of a balance between potentially conflicting policies. 6 When this is the case, activity which is arguably illegal
may be in fact socially desirable. More precise rules which refine the
meaning of the law are then attractive to avoid the costs of chilling the
socially desirable behavior. 7
We should not make too much of this benefit of more precise rules.
The potential chilling effect of vague regulations does not make generally dysfunctional the efforts of lower echelon officers to avoid the
confinement of their bureaucracy's discretion. For example, most
questionably legal CETA-related activity, like most other activity which
is only arguably legal, was not socially desirable. CETA policymakers
probably had little concern that regional officers might have discouraged most prime sponsor actions which were at least close to being
inconsistent with the intent of the enactors of CETA. These CETA

tion, see note 51 supra. Continuing flexibility may have been necessary to determine how
the goals actually did conflict for a particular prime sponsor, and to determine which
goals seemed most desirable and could be most easily obtained in a particular situation.
6
For instance, the CETA requirement that a prime sponsor provide equitable service
to "significant segments of the eligible population in the areas it serves," 29 U.S.C.
§ 816(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) may have balanced considerations of equity against the
general CETA policy favoring local design of programs best suited to a particular area.
See 29 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 1980). A decision to include geographic regions as a
significant segment, see text accompanying note 38 supra, would therefore have affected
the balance which was struck.
7
See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3,1. LEG. STUn. 257,
262-263 (1974).
The national ETA office probably also could have encouraged the regional office to
permit more aggressive prime sponsor experimentation by insuring that the internal
bureaucratic incentive system minimized regional officers' concern with creating controversy at the national office. See text accompanying note 59 supra. Not surprisingly,
some studies of bureaucratic behavior have found that civil servants are more likely to
take risks when they are more secure in their positions. E.g., P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF
BUREAUCRACY 246-247 (1955).
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policymakers probably only needed to be concerned with specifying
the legality of the kinds of prime sponsor activity which they wished to
encourage. They could wait tojudge the legality of other activity until it
was presented to them in a particular case."8

"ETA officials could also have waited to determine whether the legal activity was
sufficiently serious to warrant any allocation of ETA enforcement resources. ETA
officials, like any officers with law enforcement responsibilities, can get more deterrent
value out of their enforcement dollars if they do not announce in advance precisely how
dollars are to be spent. But see K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION, supraat 74 n.4 (acknowledging that unenforced legislation may have a deterrent value, but professing that "open"
government is more valuable).

